CVE-2026-82617

apache opennlp

score 30CRITICAL 10

Summary

The two built-in name-finder patterns exposed by opennlp.tools.namefind.RegexNameFinderFactory - DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.EMAIL and DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.URL - contain ambiguous nested quantifiers. An application that obtains these finders through RegexNameFinderFactory.getDefaultRegexNameFinders(...) and then applies them to untrusted text through RegexNameFinder.find(String[]) or RegexNameFinder.find(String) can be driven into super-linear backtracking or into unbounded matcher recursion by a small crafted input. For the EMAIL pattern, a long run of local-part characters that is never followed by an @ forces the matcher to re-scan to end-of-input from every starting offset. Cost grows quadratically with input length: an input of approximately 32 KB consumes several seconds of CPU in a single find() call and returns no match, and each doubling of the input multiplies the cost roughly four-fold. For the URL pattern, the query-string sub-expression nests a capturing repetition inside an outer repetition. The JDK matcher recurses once per query token, so an input of approximately 4 KB containing many &-separated tokens exhausts the thread stack and causes java.lang.StackOverflowError to propagate out of find(), terminating the calling thread. On a thread created with a smaller stack (for example -Xss512k, typical of server worker pools) approximately 1 KB is sufficient. In both cases an attacker who can supply text for analysis can convert a single request into seconds to minutes of pinned CPU, or into an abrupt thread death, denying service to the embedding application. No authentication, special configuration, or model file is required beyond the application having selected one of the two built-in finders. This issue affects Apache OpenNLP: from 2.0.0 through 2.5.11; from 3.0.0-M1 through 3.0.0-M5. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.5.12, or to 3.0.0-M6 for users tracking the 3.0.0 milestone line, which fix the issue.

Published 2026-09-11 · first seen here 2026-10-10

Analysis & write-ups

No technical write-up from a research team yet. Contact Zero checks Unit 42, Google/Mandiant, Microsoft, Talos, CrowdStrike, Rapid7, watchTowr and others several times a day, plus NVD and CISA reference links.

Where it shows in your logs

Server or web application · Denial of service medium confidence

What to look for

Service crashes or restarts lined up with bursts of traffic from a few sources
The application's process (w3wp.exe, java, tomcat, node, php-fpm, httpd, python) starting shells or LOLBins (cmd, powershell, sh, bash, curl, wget, certutil)
New script files in web roots (.jsp, .aspx, .php): a web shell
Requests to unusual URLs on the application from internet IPs right before any of the above
Outbound connections from the server to new external IPs

Data sources

Web server and WAF logs · ATT&CK DS0015 Application Log Content

Sentinel: W3CIISLogAppServiceHTTPLogsAzureDiagnostics (Application Gateway / Front Door WAF)_Im_WebSession
Splunk: Web.Webms:iis:autoaccess_combinedWAF / proxy sourcetypes
CrowdStrike: Falcon Next-Gen SIEM: third-party web / WAF / proxy logs

Process creation · ATT&CK DS0009 Process Creation

Sentinel: DeviceProcessEventsSecurityEvent (4688)Sysmon Event ID 1_Im_ProcessCreate
Splunk: Endpoint.ProcessesXmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/OperationalWinEventLog:Security (4688)
CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2SyntheticProcessRollup2

File creation · ATT&CK DS0022 File Creation

Sentinel: DeviceFileEventsSysmon Event ID 11_Im_FileEvent
Splunk: Endpoint.FilesystemSysmon Event ID 11
CrowdStrike: NewExecutableWrittenNewScriptWritten*FileWritten events

Network connections · ATT&CK DS0029 Network Connection Creation / Network Traffic Flow

Sentinel: DeviceNetworkEventsCommonSecurityLog (firewall)_Im_NetworkSession
Splunk: Network_Traffic.All_TrafficFirewall sourcetypes (pan:traffic, fortigate_traffic, cisco:asa)
CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4NetworkConnectIP6